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Abstract 
At the heart of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are substantial trade preferences 
which, coupled with the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), grant a wide range of goods 
produced in qualified African countries duty-free access to USA. To be AGOA-eligible, countries 
are assessed annually on their progress in undertaking appropriate economic, institutional and 
human rights reforms. Our paper seeks to cover new grounds by exploring whether exports of 
apparel to US crowds out EU-15’s imports from Africa over the period 2001-2016. Two-stage 
least squares estimates of our gravity model provide no evidence of trade displacement but, 
instead, provide support for the hypothesis of complementarity of African exports to the two key 
markets. Positive impact of bilateral trade between US and Africa on EU-African trade is evident 
mainly after the phasing out of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. We also examine whether 
the more relaxed special waiver embodied in AGOA’s apparel provision causes Non-Knitted 
exports to EU-15 to be crowded out.  We find that Special Rule beneficiaries' exports to the two 
markets still complement each other, but for every percentage increase in exports to USA, there is 
a less than proportionate increase in exports to EU-15, indicating a higher utilisation of the 
special waiver. 
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1. Introduction 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was introduced by the United States in the 
year 2000 with the objectives of expanding and deepening trade and investment relationship with 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), encouraging economic growth and development and facilitating the 
continent’s integration into the global economy. At the heart of AGOA are substantial trade 
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preferences, which coupled with the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), grant a wide range 
of goods produced in qualified countries duty-free access to the US. To be AGOA-eligible, 
countries are assessed on an annual basis on their progress in meeting a set of specific criteria 
including establishment of market-based economy and rule of law, strengthening of the private 
sector, reforms to alleviate poverty and combat corruption, better access to health services and 
education recognition of core labour standards and elimination of barriers to US trade and 
investment.  
Most of these eligibility requirements encourage SSA countries to undertake appropriate 
economic, institutional and human rights reforms that in turn reduce behind-the-border barriers to 
trade. The need for enhanced behind-the-border trade facilitating and growth enhancing amenities, 
such as improved ‘hard infrastructure’ (highways, railways, ports, etc) and ‘soft infrastructure’ 
(better institutions, higher transparency, more competition, stronger governance, etc) as a means 
to facilitate economic growth and development is well documented in literature (see for example, 
Limão and Venables, 2001; Francois and Manchin, 2006; Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2008; 
Iwanow and Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
While the impacts of AGOA on US imports from Sub-Saharan Africa have received a lot of 
attention in the literature, few studies have examined whether an increase in African exports to the 
US affects similar exports to other key markets such as EU-15 offering similar preferences. This 
paper adds to the discussion of trade redirection from EU to US due to AGOA as proposed by 
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010). Using data for the apparel sector, we employ a gravity model 
framework to analyse whether higher apparel exports to the US have a complementary or 
crowding-out effect on exports to the EU. The apparel sector has been identified as one of the three 
non-crude petroleum sectors benefitting most from the legislation, along with transportation 
equipment and refined petroleum products (USITC, 2014).  In first three years since AGOA’s 
inception, the value of US imports of apparel rose sharply but later dropped to a lower level. Over 
the 2001-2016 period, however, the value of US apparel imports remained higher than EU-15’s 
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imports from the same group of countries.  It would therefore be interesting to quantitatively assess 
whether there has been any displacement effects from EU-15 to US following AGOA’s 
implementation, more so given that EU also offers duty-free access to African apparel.  
The extent of preferential access, measured by the average most-favoured-nation tariff, to the 
US market under AGOA does not differ greatly from that granted by the EU’s preferential regimes 
under the Cotonou agreement and EBA, but there is a significant divergence on rules of origin 
(Portugal-Perez, 2008). For example, while the EU’s rules require a double transformation process 
in which yarn should be woven into fabric in the beneficiary country or in a country qualifying for 
cumulation under EU schemes and then made up into apparel in the beneficiary country, AGOA’s 
Special Rule allows lesser developed countries to use fabric originating from anywhere in the 
world, hence allowing these countries to take advantage of cheaper sources. Apparel products 
using third country fabric gain preferential access to the US but not to the EU market (Brenton and 
Özden, 2005). Rules of origin are more costly for non-knitted apparel as fabric is a key input 
compared to knitted items where typically fabric is not involved.  We also look at the apparel sub-
sectors, namely knitted (CH61) and non-knitted (CH62), and examine whether there has been a 
deflection of exports in the latter sub-group to the market offering more liberal rules.  
The displacement or complementarity effect uncovered by the analysis would yield interesting 
insights on the success of the clothing provision of the Act. If bilateral trade from Africa is 
redirected from EU to US, this would imply that African apparel exporters find AGOA’s market 
access provisions, including its more relaxed rules of origins, to be more beneficial. This would 
provide the much anticipated support and credibility to the clothing program, seen as a centrepiece 
of the legislation at the time of implementation. AGOA intentionally targeted the highly labour-
intensive apparel sector for special benefits with a view to not only foster employment creation 
opportunities in all beneficiary countries, but also to give Africa another chance to lift its apparel 
exports to threshold productivity levels and carve a niche amidst an increasingly competitive 
global trading environment. Apparel production is considered as a manufacturing sector with low 
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technological and investment barriers to entry, requiring relatively low skilled labour forces, hence 
relevant to many African nations (Williams, 2015). 
On the other hand, if there is complementarity between EU and US apparel imports, this would 
imply that African exporters still see EU as a natural market and that AGOA preferences were not 
being fully utilised by all beneficiaries to cause an offsetting effect, thus undermining one of the 
key intentions of the act. From the US importers’ perspective, tariff margins offered by AGOA 
would not provide enough incentives to influence apparel sourcing decisions away from more 
competitive suppliers from around the world. International competitiveness requires, among other 
things, modern business practices, good infrastructure and trade logistics. Earlier studies have 
linked poor export performance in the region to inadequate infrastructure (Limão and Venables, 
2001), low levels of per capita income, small country size, geography (Rodrik, 1998), domestic 
trade policies (Wang and Winters, 1998) and transport costs and other natural barriers (Morrissey, 
2005). These could still represent major impediments to trade in many African nations. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a descriptive overview of US and EU 
preferential trading schemes with Africa. Section 3 then reviews the literature. Model specification 
and data sources are outlined in Section 4. Estimation results and discussion are provided in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. US and EU Trading Arrangements with Africa 
2.1. US-Africa Trade Relation 
The centrepiece of US trade policy for Africa is the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), a non-reciprocal trade agreement signed on May 18, 2000 by US Congress. Initially 
designed to cover an 8-year period, the program was extended to 2015 in the AGOA Acceleration 
Act of 2004 (AGOA III).  On June 29, 2015, the Trade Preferences Extension Act renewed the 
program for a further 10 years. The legislation also includes a mandate for US and African 
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government officials to meet and discuss economic issues including US development assistance 
to Africa through the AGOA forum. 
AGOA eligibility is not an automatic process. Country eligibility is reviewed annually by the 
US President, who grants beneficiary status to an African nation if it is committed to: developing 
market-based economies, political and legal institutions; removing barriers to US trade and 
investment; improving intellectual property rights; fighting corruption; reducing poverty; 
protecting human and worker rights, and eradicating child labour (AGOA 2000).  
AGOA allows eligible African nations to export non-apparel and apparel products to the US 
without incurring a tariff charge. It expands the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) list 
of approximately 4,600 non-apparel products (such as watches, footwear, handbags, luggage and 
work gloves to name a few) adding 1,800 other items; representing additional markets to which 
only AGOA-eligible countries have access. African countries must be eligible for GSP to become 
AGOA beneficiaries. As a result, AGOA countries can export about 6,400 items without duty 
restrictions to the United States. 
Apparel articles, generally excluded from the US GSP1, are exempt from US import tariff 
under AGOA. This trade preference is, however, not automatic as soon as AGOA eligibility is 
granted. To qualify for the Apparel provision, countries must have in place (i) an effective apparel 
visa system to prevent illegal shipment and use of counterfeit documentation and (ii) appropriate 
enforcement and verification procedures. The provision’s product specific rules of origin (PSRO)2 
were designed in line with the triple-transformation process (cotton to yarn to textile to apparel) 
prevailing under other US trade concessions programmes such as North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (Portugal-Perez, 2008).  Apparel has 
                                               
1 The US GSP allows duty free access to some handicraft items certified for being hand-loomed and of folklore nature under 
the ‘Certified Textile Handicraft Agreements’ signed by the United States and fifteen beneficiary countries (United States Trade 
Representative, These items are not part of the HS61 (knitted apparel) and HS 62 (non-knitted apparel) considered in this paper 
2 These elaborate sets of rules, designed primarily to prevent trade deflection, apply in a “non-homogeneous” manner across 
product categories. Rules of origins are guidelines for establishing the origin or ‘economic nationality’ of the goods and not just 
the country they have been shipped from but also the place where they are deemed to have been produced. This ensures that 
concessionary access given to a particular market benefits the intended recipient and not third parties. 
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to be assembled in one or more AGOA eligible country from US fabrics (or African-country 
fabrics up to a specified percentage), which in turn were made from US yarn3. Apparels made in 
AGOA eligible countries from US fabric and yarn have duty-free and quota-free access to the US 
market without limitations. Apparels made with domestically produced fabric or that produced in 
other AGOA beneficiary countries also qualify for concessionary treatment but are subject to a 
quantitative restriction4.  
The Apparel provision also embodies a ‘Special Rule’ (or ‘third country fabric rule of origin’) 
designed for lesser-developed AGOA beneficiaries. The Special Rule relaxes the apparel 
provision’s rules of origin by allowing these lesser-developed AGOA beneficiaries to manufacture 
with fabrics and yarns originating from anywhere in the world without incurring a tariff charge. In 
effect, this special provision allows for a single transformation requirement (fabric to apparel) 
instead of the more rigorous triple transformation. AGOA eligible nations with a GNP per capita 
below $1,500 in 1998 receive this benefit unconditionally and beneficiaries above this threshold 
are subject to terms and conditions set by the International Trade Commission. However, despite 
having a level of GNP per capita exceeding the threshold, Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius have 
been granted LDC status. South Africa is the only country that does not qualify for the special 
waiver. Since its inception in 2001, the Special Rule has been renewed four times5 and remains in 
effect until September 2025. 
 
 
2.2 EU-Africa Preferential Trading Schemes 
                                               
3 Under the “De Minimis Rule”, apparel containing fibres or yarns not wholly formed in the US or other AGOA 
beneficiaries retain duty free benefits provided the weight of such inputs do not exceed 10% of the total weight (AGOA, 
https://agoa.info).  
4 AGOA restricts imports of apparel made with regional fabric to a fixed percentage of the aggregate square meter 
equivalents of all apparel articles imported into the US. Starting October 1, 2007, the annual aggregate quantity of imports under 
these provisions was an amount not to exceed 7% of all apparel imported into the US. Any excess imports over this amount are 
subject to applicable tariffs. In addition, the duty-free cap is not allocated among countries but works on a “first come, first 
serve” principle (OTEXA, 2017). Moreover, the value of any foreign-sourced interlinings, findings and trimmings should not 
exceed 25 per cent of the cost of the components of the assembled apparel article. 
5 The special rule was extended in 2004 for three years, in 2007 for another five years, in 2012 for a further three years and 
in 2015 for ten years. 
  7 
Since 1975, African countries have enjoyed unilateral preferential access to the EU market 
under Lomé Convention and its successive rounds. Deemed as a breach of the WTO ‘most-
favoured nation’ principle, the convention was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. This 
marked the beginning of a reciprocal but asymmetric market access, where the EU provides full 
duty free market access to ACP countries that ratify Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
and the latter commit to progressively open their markets to EU. To assist the integration of least 
developed countries into the global economy, EU launched the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) 
initiative in 2001 as an extension of its GSP scheme to meet the needs of least developed countries 
worldwide and granted full duty free and quota-free access to the EU for all their exports with the 
exception of arms and armaments. 
Product specific rules of origin (PSRO) for textile and apparel under EBA and Cotonou 
agreement follow those postulated by EU’s “single list” (Portugal-Perez, 2008). The “Single List”, 
implemented since July 2000, harmonised rules of origin under various trading agreements, and 
extended the double transformation process to all apparel lines under chapter 61 and 62 of the 
Harmonised system.  For textile and apparel, the rules of origin required that apparel be 
manufactured from yarn wholly produced in the exporter country. Production from yarn entails a 
double transformation process in the beneficiary country, with the yarn being woven into fabric 
and fabric cut and made into clothing (yarn to fabric to apparel). The EBA initiative imposes a 
further burden on African countries in that the cumulation provision is ‘bilateral’6  (EU and 
beneficiary country). In other words, fabrics cannot be sourced from countries in the region to 
manufacture clothing; only fabrics made in the exporting country or the EU are acceptable. 
Cotonou agreement allows full cumulation among African countries so that regional fabrics can 
be used without compromising origin requirements. It also attached extensive conditions to 
potential cumulation with non-ACP countries, including South Africa.  
                                               
6 With bilateral cumulation, parties can use intermediate goods from each other without losing origin status. 
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2.3 AGOA Countries’ Apparel Exports to US and EU-15 
US total imports under AGOA are heavily concentrated in crude petroleum, which account 
for a share of roughly 90%. Imports other than crude petroleum include agriculture, manufactured 
goods (including electronics, machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals and miscellaneous 
manufacturing), natural resources (non-crude petroleum energy, minerals and metals) and textiles 
and apparels (USITC, 2014). Apparel was the main non-petroleum product category imported 
under AGOA in the early years of the program, but has since faltered in rank and value.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, exports in this category increased sharply in the first three years of 
AGOA’s launch, growing by 70% on average. Since 2005, which also marks the termination of 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, US imports of apparel from the region dwindled, posting 
an average growth of -3.4% to 2016. The value of EU-15 apparel imports from the same group 
countries, on the other hand, stayed relatively flat until 2008, declined during the recession and 
picked up again in 2013.  A similar pattern is observed with US imports post 2008. Overall, 
however, the value of US imports of apparel remained higher than EU imports since AGOA’s 
inception. 
A more disaggregated view of the apparel sector shows that US imports of knitted and non-
knitted apparel articles from Africa bear a very close resemblance (Figure 2). This contrasts 
remarkably with EU-15, which appears to source more Knitted apparel (CH61) from Africa than 
Non-Knitted items. 
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3. Literature review 
Considering that the intent of AGOA is to enhance Africa’s integration into the global 
economy by encouraging trade and investment, generate employment and increase productivity 
and per capita income growth, its impact on beneficiaries’ exports to the US has generated a lot 
interest among researchers. To this end, various approaches have been used including computable 
general equilibrium models (Bouët et al., 2010), partial equilibrium models (Mattoo et al., 2003; 
Shapouri and Trueblood, 2003; Laborde, 2008), analysis of raw trade data and AGOA provisions 
(Brenton and Hoppe, 2006; Brenton and Ikezuki, 2004; Dean and Wainio, 2006), country case 
studies (Lall, 2005; Rolfe and Woodward, 2005; Phelps et al., 2009), gravity model (Nouve and 
Staatz, 2003; Nouve, 2005; Seyoum, 2007; Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008; Mueller, 2008) and triple 
difference-in-differences models (Collier and Venables, 2007; Frazer and Van Biesebroeck; 
2010)7.  
Yatrakis (2002) is among the first to assess the impact of AGOA, claiming that $1 billion of 
trade was created within its first year, accounting for 17% of total SSA exports to the US. However, 
this was very much limited to five countries, with South Africa responsible for two thirds of 
exports via AGOA.  Given that South Africa is the largest and most developed in the region, which 
implies fewer internal constraints compared to other beneficiaries, Yatrakis explains that it is not 
surprising to find South Africa instantly benefitting from AGOA. More recently, Didia et al. 
(2015) perform a cross-country analysis by applying the gravity model using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation technique on aggregated data 
spanning 12 years. They find a large, positive and significant impact caused by the Act, but the 
promising results wither once the five major oil producing nations are not included. The authors 
conclude that there is a disproportionate impact in favour of crude oil exporters, which does not 
align with the intentions of the Act, and suggest that any future research regarding AGOA should 
                                               
7 See Condon and Stern (2011) for an interesting review of these studies. 
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be carried out specifically on non-energy products to remove distortion (Didia et al., 2015). The 
disentanglement Didia et al. propose has partly been accomplished in previous work of Tadesse 
and Fayissa (2008). Using the gravity model to assess the impact of AGOA, they undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of manufactured and non-manufactured goods at a 2-digit HTS level. The 
authors state that AGOA had a statistically significant trade initiation effect across 24 of the 99 
product categories (compared to negative and significant for just 2 product categories), with the 
effect on apparel exports being particularly large.  
Among all manufactured goods sector, apparel witnessed a particularly sharp rise in exports 
following AGOA implementation. The Apparel provision however worked in favour of a small 
group of countries, mainly located in Southern and Eastern Africa (Rolfe and Woodward, 2005; 
Olarreaga and Özden (2004); Edwards and Lawrence, 2010). Primary research is used by Phelps 
et al. (2009) to assess AGOA’s impact on Kenya’s clothing industry. Interacting with two thirds 
of the clothing producers in the country, they conclude that AGOA has reignited the industry. A 
similar success story resonates for the small landlocked country, Lesotho, whose apparel exports 
surpassed that of more coastal countries having more established industrial sectors such as 
Mauritius and South Africa (Lall, 2005).  
Although Seyoum (2007) finds no significant effect of AGOA on beneficiaries’ overall exports 
to the US over 2000-2004 period, his analysis of energy, minerals and apparel sectors shows that 
AGOA-induced statistically significant gains only in the case of apparel exports. Portugal-Perez 
(2008) reports that the more relaxed rules of origin embodied in the special provision of AGOA 
increased exports of apparel by about 300 % for the top seven beneficiaries and 96% for the whole 
sample of 22 countries eligible for the special provision. Using a triple difference-in-differences 
regression as a means to effectively isolate AGOA and circumvent issues rising from endogeneity 
of policy, the dispersed impact on apparel products on SSA countries is confirmed by Frazer and 
Van Biesebroeck (2010) who estimate a variation ranging from 9% to 155% rise in exports, with 
five out the 26 countries being negatively affected. They, however, establish that the impact of the 
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Act on apparel trade for the whole sample of countries is substantial and grows significantly over 
time from 21.9% in 2002 to 44.4% in 2006. Collier and Venables (2007) find that the AGOA 
apparel provision increased apparel exports to the United States by a factor of 7.4 over 1991-2005. 
In contrast to the large body of work on impacts of the Act on exports to the United States, the 
indirect effects of such trade policy on export to other key markets is a relatively less covered area. 
As part of robustness checks for their main findings, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) provide 
some evidence that heightened US imports under AGOA is not a result of trade redirection from 
EU. They use imports from 25 EU countries instead of US imports as dependent variable in their 
specification but limit their time coverage to 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2003. Collier and Venables 
(2007) also factor in EU imports in their regression model by considering the value of apparel 
exports from the exporting country to the US relative to its apparel exports to the EU as the 
dependent variable. Using dummy variables, they compare the effectiveness of AGOA and EU’s 
‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) initiative on African apparel exports. They find that AGOA has a 
more favourable effect on African apparel exports compared to EU’s trade preferences and 
attribute this to AGOA’s special apparel waiver.  
4. Model Specification and Data Sources 
The Gravity Model 
In line with the literature on trade displacement effects, we use the gravity model as our 
econometric specification. In its basic form, the gravity model posits that trade between two 
countries is positively influenced by economic size, captured by gross domestic product of the 
trading partners, and negatively affected by distance between them. The model is augmented with 
other trade inhibiting and trade facilitating variables and has been used and developed in Anderson 
(1979); Bergstrand (1985); Deardorff (1995); Eaton and Kortum (2002); Evenett and Keller, 2002. 
Empirical work have been proposed by Eichengreen et al. (2004), Greenaway et al. (2008), Amann 
et al. (2009),  Athukorala (2009) on China effect on Asian countries’ exports; Giovanetti and 
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Sanfilippo (2009) on African exporters and Giovanetti and Sanfilippo (2012) on  EU exports to 
OECD markets.   
 
For our purpose, we estimate the following gravity specification: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑈𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                 (1) 
where  
𝐸𝑈𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗 Imports of EU-15 country i from African country j 
𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 US imports from African country j  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 Real GDP of EU country i 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 Real GDP of African country j 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 Real GDP per capita of EU country i 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑗𝑡 Real GDP per capita of African country j 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 Distance between country i and j 
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑗 Product of land areas (km
2) of country i and j 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 Number of landlocked countries in pair (0/1/2)  
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 Binary dummy =1 if i ever colonized j, zero otherwise 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 Binary dummy = 1 when country i and j share common language, zero 
otherwise 
Polityjt Polity index score of country j 
 
We use EU and US imports as our dependent variable. A negative coefficient on our variable 
of interest, US imports from African country j (USIMPj), would indicate displacement of EU 
exports from an increase in exports to US under AGOA.  A positive coefficient would imply that 
exports to the two markets are complementary. GDP and per capita GDP capture the sizes of 
African exporters and EU importers. This in turn determines export supply of exporters and import 
demand respectively.   
The product of land areas of country pairs traditionally has a negative relation with the 
dependent variable as it represents a greater amount of production occurring further away from 
the borders of a country with the aim of supplying the domestic market (Greenaway et al. 2008). 
Landlockedness raises transportation costs in terms of port access, therefore negatively affecting 
bilateral trade. Colonial links are expected to increase bilateral trade due to the infrastructure 
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established that country j will still benefit from, sharing a language is another common variable in 
the contemporary gravity model that is known to have a positive impact (Greenaway, 2008; 
Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008; Didia et al. 2015; Didier and Hoarau, 2016).  
Lastly, Polity captures the effect of better institutionalised democracy of country j and is 
expected to have a positive influence on trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) proposed that 
hidden transaction costs such as imperfect contract enforcement have a significant impact on the 
propensity to trade and should therefore be included in the gravity equation. This has typically 
been captured by corruption indices in the literature. We use a broader measure of individual 
exporter’s institutional quality and political stability (polity) to capture such hidden costs. As noted 
by Eichengreen et al. (2004, p. 13), such variables have the additional benefit of being close 
substitutes for country fixed effects and should therefore be included in the regression.  
Data Sources  
Bilateral apparel imports of each EU-15 country from 54 African countries are sourced 
from EU trade since 1988, Eurostat and are converted to US dollars using exchange rate from 
FRED (2017). Bilateral US imports from Africa are obtained from USITC Interactive Tariff and 
Trade Dataweb. US GDP deflator is then used to calculate real trade values for both EU-15 imports 
and US imports. Real GDP and Population data are taken from the World Development Indicators. 
Distance, product of land areas, landlockedness, colonial relationships and common language are 
obtained from CEPII’s GEOdist database.  Polity data is sourced from the Centre for Systemic 
Peace’s Polity IV Annual time series. Information on AGOA and special waiver country 
eligibilities (presented in Appendix A) are obtained from International Trade Administration 
(ITA), US Department of Commerce.  The descriptive statistics of variables in our specification 
are given in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
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lnEUIMPjt 4,507 9.124 3.527 0.0208 19.55 
lnUSIMPjt 8,234 11.26 3.764 5.490 20.04 
lnGDPit 12,495 27.07 1.144 24.43 28.96 
lnGDPjt 12,095 22.71 1.534 18.59 26.86 
lnGDPCit 12,495 10.66 0.354 9.963 11.63 
lnGDPCjt 12,095 7.050 1.038 5.267 9.920 
lnDISTij 12,495 3.771 0.121 3.375 4.010 
lnAREAij 12,495 10.44 0.986 7.178 12.14 
Landlockedij 12,495 0.419 0.533 0 2 
Colonyijt 12,495 0.0735 0.261 0 1 
Comlangij 12,495 0.133 0.340 0 1 
Polityjt 11,555 2.035 5.205 -9 10 
      
 
5. Results and Discussion 
We estimate equation (1) using OLS and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS)8 and results are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. Column (1) shows the gravity estimates for the African countries eligible 
for the wearing apparel provision over the entire period 2001-2016. To factor in possible effects 
of the phasing out of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) on Apparel exports, we 
separately consider four years before the removal of the agreement (2001-2004) and four years 
after its complete phase out (2005-2008). Results are reported in columns (2) and (3) respectively. 
We also examine whether AGOA impacts on EU exports differ by type of apparel exported, 
especially given that AGOA offers more lenient rules of origin. The last two columns (4) and (5) 
show results for Knitted Apparel (CH61) and Non-knitted Apparel (CH62) sub-sectors. 
Table 2: OLS Estimates  
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
(1) 
All Apparel 
(2) 
All Apparel 
With ATC 
(3) 
All Apparel 
Without ATC 
(4) 
Knitted 
(CH61) 
(5) 
Non-Knitted 
(CH62) 
Log EU Imports 2001-2016 2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2016 2001-2016 
                                               
8 We employ two instruments that have been widely used in exports displacement literature for the 
potentially endogenous USIMP. These are (i) US GDP expressed in natural logarithm and (ii) the 
distance between US and each African nation, also in natural logarithm. It is reasonable to believe 
that US imports of apparel would be commensurate to its GDP. By the same token, the bilateral 
distance is a key determinant of trade between two partners as it is a reflection of transportation 
costs.  
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Ln USIMPjt 0.270*** 0.146** 0.0979** 0.182*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0566) (0.0434) (0.0350) (0.0262) 
Ln GDPit 0.617*** 0.667*** 0.632*** 0.616*** 0.566*** 
 (0.159) (0.195) (0.211) (0.201) (0.147) 
Ln GDPjt 0.355*** -0.0897 0.290* 0.259* 0.220** 
 (0.115) (0.202) (0.167) (0.139) (0.108) 
Ln GDPCit -1.988*** -1.905** -2.900*** -2.718*** -1.677*** 
 (0.495) (0.754) (0.748) (0.622) (0.614) 
Ln GDPCjt -0.170 0.485 -0.236 -0.292 -0.343** 
 (0.197) (0.304) (0.285) (0.252) (0.156) 
Ln DISTij 4.926*** 8.691*** 6.999*** 8.879*** 1.425 
 (1.417) (2.272) (1.906) (1.811) (1.164) 
Ln AREAij -0.403* -0.113 -0.536* -0.580** 0.0904 
 (0.223) (0.262) (0.282) (0.234) (0.215) 
Landlockedij -0.651** -0.817** -0.759** -0.472 -0.355* 
 (0.269) (0.386) (0.340) (0.337) (0.211) 
Colonyijt 1.897*** 1.528** 1.240 1.581** 1.889*** 
 (0.654) (0.763) (0.803) (0.757) (0.487) 
Comlangij 1.107** 1.565*** 1.364** 0.983 0.781** 
 (0.509) (0.578) (0.601) (0.597) (0.365) 
Polityjt 0.148*** 0.159*** 0.182*** 0.149*** 0.0955*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0354) (0.0254) 
Constant -12.15 -23.84* -4.876 -13.51 -1.753 
 (8.111) (12.63) (11.27) (10.28) (8.461) 
Observations 2,578 514 704 1,841 1,410 
R-squared 0.405 0.507 0.384 0.404 0.299 
 
Notes on Table: Robust standard errors in parentheses.    *, **, *** indicate insignificance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively  
 
As expected, importer’s and exporter’s GDP are found to have a statistically significant 
positive effect on bilateral trade. Being landlocked and having a large land area reduce trade while 
an improvement in institutional quality and sharing colonial ties and common language facilitate 
trade. However, bilateral distance and importer’s GDP per capita, despite being statistically 
significant, carry the wrong signs. This may be attributable to the bias caused by the endogeneity 
of our key variable, USIMPjt. In general, our variable of interest is statistically significant and 
shows no evidence of exports displacement. In fact, the positive coefficients point to some degree 
of complementarity between African apparel exports to USA and EU.  
 
The gravity model performs better once endogeneity of USIMP is accounted for – see 
Table 3 below. The high values of the first-stage F-statistic and statistically non-significant Hansen 
J statistic support the relevance and exogeneity of our instruments. EU-15 countries import more 
with an increase in their GDP and bilateral distance reduces the trade flow between partners. 
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Importers’ and exporters’ GDP per capita and exporters’ GDP are found not to be statistically 
significant. This may not be surprising given that preferential trade in a specific sector is being 
considered. Unlike the case of aggregate trade, exporters’ GDP may not matter and so would GDP 
per capita that capture market size. Landlockedness is found to deter trade flows due to higher 
transportation costs as these nations inevitably rely on political stability, infrastructure and 
institutions of neighbouring transit countries. Sharing a common language and colonial ties 
enhance trade flows. Not surprisingly, countries with better institutional and democratic 
framework also engage more in trade. Rampant corruption, underdeveloped institutions, 
constraints on business competition, and weak governance, on the other hand, impose high trading 
costs placing some African nations at a considerable disadvantage (Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 
2008). 
 
Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates  
Dependent 
Variable:  
Log EU Imports 
(1) 
All Apparel 
(2) 
All Apparel 
With ATC 
(3) 
All Apparel 
Without ATC 
(4) 
Knitted 
(CH61) 
(5) 
Non-Knitted 
(CH62) 
 2001-2016 2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2016 2001-2016 
Ln USIMPjt 1.084*** 1.301*** 1.525*** 1.163*** 0.865*** 
 (0.148) (0.373) (0.385) (0.157) (0.160) 
Ln GDPit 0.727*** 0.882*** 0.658** 0.563*** 0.639*** 
 (0.178) (0.263) (0.294) (0.196) (0.175) 
Ln GDPjt 0.0618 -0.926** 0.361 -0.0525 -0.177 
 (0.153) (0.444) (0.275) (0.180) (0.160) 
Ln GDPCit 0.149 0.307 -0.255 -0.201 0.677 
 (0.790) (1.595) (1.302) (0.791) (0.859) 
Ln GDPCjt 0.175 1.219** -0.689 0.104 0.174 
 (0.233) (0.520) (0.454) (0.273) (0.237) 
Ln DISTij -8.502*** -14.17* -13.75** -9.888*** -7.354*** 
 (2.768) (8.085) (5.804) (3.305) (2.426) 
Ln AREAij 0.256 1.152* -0.103 -0.0999 0.942*** 
 (0.264) (0.604) (0.411) (0.264) (0.334) 
Landlockedij -0.636** -0.849* -0.716 -1.050*** -0.339 
 (0.320) (0.507) (0.582) (0.369) (0.276) 
Colonyijt 1.863*** 0.856 2.023* 1.863** 1.802*** 
 (0.661) (0.853) (1.147) (0.759) (0.590) 
Comlangij 1.564*** 2.657*** 1.507* 1.219** 0.985** 
 (0.559) (0.737) (0.854) (0.613) (0.473) 
Polityjt 0.146*** 0.0660 0.166*** 0.114*** 0.0567 
 (0.0390) (0.0577) (0.0576) (0.0380) (0.0349) 
Constant -0.290 18.56 22.52 19.83* -6.409 
 (9.146) (18.06) (15.10) (10.93) (10.01) 
Observations 2,578 514 704 1,841 1,410 
1st Stage F-Stat 60.64 10.07 13.61 77.82 28.78 
Hansen J (pvalue) 0.336 0.512 0.416 0.475 0.699 
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Notes on Table: Robust standard errors in parentheses.    *, **, *** indicate insignificance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
         Moreover, the complementary effects of African apparel exports between the USA and EU 
are maintained across various (sub)samples with all coefficients of  lnUSIMP being positive and 
statistically significant, thus echoing the findings of Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010).  Over the 
entire period (2001-2016), a 1% increase in apparel exports to the US confers roughly the same 
percentage (1.1%) increase in exports to the EU. When the structural change from the removal of 
quotas on exports of textiles and clothing on 1st January 2005 is taken into account, we find that 
African nations tend to export slightly more to the EU after the phase out. In the four years starting 
January 2005, a 1% rise in exports to the US led to 1.5% increase in exports to the EU (column 3) 
compared to a 1.3% increase over the 2001-2004 period (column 2). The complementary effect is 
also evident in the apparel sub-sectors (columns 4 and 5). A 1% increase in African knitted exports 
to the US leads to 1.16 % percentage increase in exports to the EU. However, a 1% increase in 
non-knitted apparel exports to the US leads to a less than proportionate rise to EU markets. 
 
Furthermore, our estimated regression coefficients are plausible and robust when importer 
fixed effects and year effects are being considered – Table 4 (see Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) 
for detailed discussion of inclusion of multilateral resistance terms in gravity model to avoid 
misspecification). Notwithstanding, the lower coefficient of the variable of interest post-ATC 
removal, the statistically significant complementary effects of African apparel exports to the two 
destinations holds across all specifications. The preference of EU markets for Knitted African 
apparel exports is again noticeable.  
One of the instrumental variable, namely lnUSGDP is dropped due to collinearity. In the 
presence of one instrument, the equation is exactly identified and standard overidentification tests 
do not apply. Two additional test statistics for the weak identification and under-identification are 
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reported. Both suggest that the instrument, bilateral distance between US and each African 
exporter in logarithmic form, is efficient.  
Table 4: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates with importer and time effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable:  
Log EU Imports 
All Apparel 
2001-2016 
 
 
 
All Apparel 
with ATC 
2001-2004 
 
 
All Apparel 
without ATC 
2005-2008 
 
Knitted 
CH61    
2001-2016 
 
 
2001-2016 
 
Non-Knitted 
CH62       
2001-2016 
 
 
Ln USIMPjt 0.995*** 1.554** 1.219*** 0.918*** 0.551*** 
 (0.230) (0.669) (0.405) (0.179) (0.116) 
Ln GDPit 1.310 9.133 -9.325 -0.855 -3.333 
 (4.018) (22.12) (16.41) (4.292) (4.075) 
Ln GDPjt 0.189 -1.219* 0.469* 0.278 0.142 
 (0.178) (0.702) (0.253) ( .177) (0.147) 
Ln GDPCit 3.474 -4.757 1.550 3.723 6.963 
 (4.598) (25.47) (12.04) (5.066) (4.944) 
Ln GDPCjt 0.000145 1.500** -0.752* -0.267 -0.240 
 (0.203) (0.733) (0.388) (0.232) (0.180) 
Ln DISTij -5.099 -19.39 -6.840 -2.959 -1.186 
 (3.735) (13.93) (6.214) (3.572) (1.782) 
Ln AREAij 0.120 1.726 -0.327 -0.569* 0.348 
 (0.401) (1.165) (0.455) (0.308) (0.337) 
Landlockedij -0.644** -0.938 -0.908 -0.739* -0.221 
 (0.310) (0.687) (0.650) (0.403) (0.247) 
Colonyijt 0.256 0.567 -0.0786 -0.0348 0.644 
 (0.593) (1.017) (1.005) (0.625) (0.479) 
Comlangij 2.393*** 1.548 2.537** 2.172*** 1.523*** 
 (0.650) (1.002) (1.044) (0.719) (0.439) 
Polityjt 0.163*** 0.0621 0.162*** 0.149*** 0.0798*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0788) (0.0516) (0.0377) (0.0262) 
Constant -63.58 -132.0 248.9 -7.757 12.17 
 (65.37) (366.4) (367.5) (70.35) (63.56) 
Importer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,578 514 704 1,841 1,410 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic 
26.42 7.571 13.97 50.62 32.30 
  p-value 0.0000 0.0059 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F  
 
statistic 
39.35 9.007 17.33 91.19 51.08 
 
 
  p-value 
 
statistic 
0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
Notes on Table: Robust standard errors in parentheses.    *, **, *** indicate insignificance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
Discussion 
Since EU rules of origin do not grant producers in African LDCs the freedom to source 
fabrics from anywhere in the world as is possible under AGOA, one would expect AGOA’s special 
rule beneficiaries to redirect their non-knitted apparel exports to the US at the expense of the EU. 
We find evidence of a preference for the US market in this sub-sector but there is no export 
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crowding out. In comparison, these countries tend to favour EU-15 market for their knitted apparel 
exports, to which EU’s more restrictive rules do not directly apply. 
 
Following AGOA’s implementation in 2000, apparel exports from the region to the US 
increased rapidly until expiry of ATC in 2005. Although a number of countries were AGOA-
eligible, over 95% of the apparel exports to the US were accounted for by a handful of countries, 
namely Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa (Gillson et.al., 
2007). Investors from quota-constrained suppliers, in particular China and Taiwan, set up factories 
in some of these countries especially those benefitting from the “third country fabric provision” 
and used them as backdoors to access US market duty free and quota-free. With the phase out of 
ATC, many Asian firms closed the apparel facilities, leading to sharp drop in apparel exports to 
the US in the first few years following its expiry.  It is not surprising to find that AGOA did not 
have any crowding out effect on apparel exports to the EU, which remained fairly steady since 
2000. The stronger complementary effect post ATC termination suggests that less competitive 
AGOA country suppliers diversified their markets away from US in face of mounting competition 
from South and East Asian apparel exporters that obtained new quota-free access to the US 
markets.  
 
Overall, despite its efforts to improve beneficiaries’ economic and institutional structure 
and more liberal rules of origin, it can be argued that AGOA did not have the ability to substantially 
attract exports away from the other major market. A number of reasons could explain this. First, 
the higher transportation costs resulting from distance and lack of efficient trade linkages to the 
US market relative to the EU is a key barrier that many African nations struggle to overcome 
(USITC, 2014). Second, the margin of preference enjoyed by African nations under AGOA is 
shrinking as more countries supply the US under other trade agreements such as Central America 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
account for a larger share of the US apparel market under preference, dwarfing by far African 
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countries’ share under AGOA (Naumann, 2012).  Third, concerns have been expressed over the 
short term and last minute renewals of the third country fabric provision. Before its latest new 
lease of life in 2015, the provision was renewed for periods of only three to five years, which are 
deemed as not certain enough to place new orders or undertake new investments (USITC, 2014). 
Investment decisions can also be influenced by the revocation of AGOA status if eligibility criteria 
are not met. With a high likelihood that some fragile African states may not meet these criteria, 
they are likely to revert to weak governance, hence forestalling potential investments that would 
only be profitable with free market access. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper extends the literature by examining potential displacement effect of apparel exports 
to the EU as a result of increased exports under AGOA over the period 2001-2016 using the gravity 
model. Our estimation strategy addresses the problem of endogeneity of our variable of interest. 
Empirical results show no evidence of such displacements but instead reveal a strong 
complementary effect between exports to the two markets. This positive effect still holds in the 
Non-Knitted (CH62) apparel sector despite a more relaxed rule of origin offered under AGOA 
compared to EU’s EBA and Cotonou Agreement. However, for every percentage increase in 
exports of Non-Knitted apparel to the US, there is a less than proportionate increase to EU-15, 
suggesting that the special waiver under AGOA remains attractive to African apparel exporters. 
Not surprisingly, EU-15 markets attract more Knitted apparel from Africa than does the US.  
It is worth noting that although a number of African countries are eligible for the Apparel 
provision, apparel exports originate from only a handful of countries; in particular Kenya, Lesotho, 
Ethiopia, Mauritius and Swaziland. Despite the duty-free privilege, other nations have not been 
successful in expanding their apparel exports due to higher transportation costs to the US relative 
to the EU.  African apparel also competes head to head against exports US neighbours who equally 
benefit from duty-free access under trade arrangements. African nations are further disadvantaged 
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by poor infrastructure, cumbersome customs procedures and dearth of technical and managerial 
talent. Uncertainty surrounding AGOA and its apparel provision renewals has also prompted 
African apparel exporters to retain their more secure EU markets.  Despite the restrictive rules of 
origins in EU’s EBA program, African apparel producers still stand to benefit from the more liberal 
cumulation allowances offered by EU’s Cotonou Agreement, allowing African apparel exporters 
to source their fabrics from the region and meet the demands of EU markets.  
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Appendix A: African Countries’ Eligibility for AGOA, Apparel Provision and Special Rule, 2001-2016 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Angola       ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Benin ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Botswana ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Burkina Faso           ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Burundi           ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cameroon ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Cape Verde ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Central Af Rep ✓ ✓ ✓                         ✓ 
Chad ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Comoros               ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Congo Dem R     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓             
Congo ep ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cote d'Ivoire   ✓ ✓A S ✓A S             ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Djibouti ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Eq. Guinea                                 
Eritrea ✓ ✓ ✓                           
Ethiopia ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Gabon  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Gambia     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S     
Ghana ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Guinea ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Guinea Bissau ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Kenya ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Lesotho ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Liberia             ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Madagascar ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S         ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Malawi ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Mali ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mauritannia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mauritius ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Mozambique ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Namibia ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Niger ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S   ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Nigeria ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Rwanda ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Sao Tome ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Senegal ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Seychelles ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sierra Leone ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Somalia                                 
South Africa ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  
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South Sudan                         ✓ ✓     
Sudan                                 
Swaziland ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S     
Tanzania ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Togo               ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Uganda ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Zambia ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Zimbabwe                                 
Source: United States International Trade Commission, (2014). Updated using information from USITC Dataweb 
and AGOA.info (https://agoa.info/about-agoa/country-eligibility.html) 
Key: ✓: Eligible for AGOA; A Eligible for Apparel Provision;  S Eligible for Special Rule  
EU-15 Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
